Open, privacy-preserving protocols for lawful surveillance by Segal, Aaron et al.
Open, privacy-preserving protocols for lawful surveillance
Aaron Segal and Joan Feigenbaum
Yale University
New Haven, CT, USA
{aaron.segal,joan.feigenbaum}@yale.edu
Bryan Ford
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL)
Lausanne, Switzerland
bryan.ford@epfl.ch
Abstract
The question of how government agencies can acquire
actionable, useful information about legitimate but un-
known targets without intruding upon the electronic ac-
tivity of innocent parties is extremely important. We ad-
dress this question by providing experimental evidence
that actionable, useful information can indeed be obtained
in a manner that preserves the privacy of innocent par-
ties and that holds government agencies accountable. In
particular, we present practical, privacy-preserving proto-
cols for two operations that law-enforcement and intel-
ligence agencies have used effectively: set intersection
and contact chaining. Experiments with our protocols
suggest that privacy-preserving contact chaining can per-
form a 3-hop privacy-preserving graph traversal produc-
ing 27,000 ciphertexts in under two minutes. These ci-
phertexts are usable in turn via privacy-preserving set in-
tersection to pinpoint potential unknown targets within a
body of 150,000 total ciphertexts within 10 minutes, with-
out exposing personal information about non-targets.
1 Introduction
As networked devices become more available, more capa-
ble, and more ubiquitous in everyday life, tension mounts
between users’ desire to safeguard their personal informa-
tion and government agencies’ desire to use that personal
information in their pursuit of criminals and terrorists.
For example, the heated (and still unresolved) discussion
about the Snowden revelations that started in 2013 is un-
derstood by many people as an example of an unpleasant,
stark choice: Citizens can either have control over their
personal information, or they can have law-enforcement
and intelligence agencies with the tools that they need to
keep the country safe. We regard this stark choice as a
false dichotomy and assert that, by deploying appropriate
security technology in the context of sound policy and the
rule of law, we can have both user privacy and effective
law enforcement and intelligence.
We draw a distinction between law-enforcement access
to third-party records held by businesses such as tele-
phone companies and encrypted information stored on an
individual’s personal devices; our work focuses on the
former, not the latter. In particular, we believe that lawful
searches of third-party records can be made much more
security- and privacy-preserving than they currently are
without compromising law-enforcement search capabili-
ties. We are not suggesting support for “key-escrowed”
encryption or general backdoors in personal devices, as
is the topic of the ongoing conflict between the FBI and
Apple.
Adopting the approach to third-party records search
taken by Bandits [15], we seek to design and implement
protocols for accountable surveillance. We require that
government surveillance be conducted according to open
processes, as defined in Section 2 below, and that the pri-
vacy of untargeted users be protected. We consider the
surveillance goals of set intersection and contact chain-
ing and show that both can be achieved in a privacy-
preserving, accountable fashion.
The utility of set-intersection protocols was demon-
strated in the High Country Bandits case [2]. After obtain-
ing cell-tower dumps – sets of about 150,000 total users
whose cell phones had been in the vicinity of three banks
at the times that those banks were robbed – the FBI in-
tersected the sets and discovered that a single phone had
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been used at all of the relevant times in all of the rele-
vant places. They arrested the owner of that phone and
were able to prove that he was one of the robbers. Al-
though this FBI dragnet was effective in catching robbers,
it also swept in the cell-phone numbers of approximately
149,999 innocent bystanders. Bandits [15] provide an ac-
countable protocol for set intersection that preserves the
privacy of innocent bystanders. Their rudimentary imple-
mentation requires just under two hours on a test instance
with 150,000 total users. In Section 3 below, we provide
a more careful implementation that is faster by a factor of
10; in particular, it runs for approximately 10.5 minutes
on the test instance of 150,000 users.
In Section 4, we turn our attention to accountable-
surveillance protocols for contact chaining. The goal of
contact chaining is to use the topology of a communica-
tion graph (e.g., a phone-call graph, email graph, or social
network) in order to identify associates (or “contacts”) of
lawfully targeted users [6]. Government agencies can then
investigate those associates to determine whether they de-
serve further attention.1 It is useful to consider both direct
contacts, i.e., users who are neighbors in the communi-
cation graph, and extended contacts, i.e., users who are
at distance k in the communication graph, for an appro-
priate constant k. In a phone-call graph, if Alice calls
Bob, and Bob calls Charlie, then Alice and Bob are direct
contacts (as are Bob and Charlie), but Alice and Charlie
are extended contacts (more precisely, contacts at distance
2). Without accountability and security mechanisms to
limit an investigation’s scope, contact chaining in a mass-
communication network can sweep in a huge number of
untargeted users. In Section 4, we provide an account-
able contact-chaining protocol that bounds the scope of
the search, uses encryption to protect untargeted users,
and is computationally efficient (in that its time complex-
ity and communication complexity are both linear in the
size of the output).
At first blush, it may seem that a symposium on
“privacy-enhancing technologies” is an odd place for re-
1Note that contact chaining is not tantamount to “guilt by associa-
tion.” Rather, it is tantamount to “suspicion by association,” which is in
fact a time-honored principal in law enforcement. When investigating a
murder, rape, or other violent felony, police departments first turn their
attention to the associates of the victim. Accountable-surveillance prac-
tices require that contacts who are suspected, investigated, and found
not to be involved in illegal activity be cleared of suspicion and that
their personal information be deleted from agencies’ databases.
sults about “accountable surveillance.” No doubt some in
the PETS community wish to prevent government agen-
cies (as well as large corporations and other powerful en-
tities) from conducting any surveillance whatsoever. As
explained in [15], a global communication system entirely
free of surveillance may be appealing in the abstract, but
it is not a very useful goal in practice. Law enforcement
and intelligence agencies have always been and will con-
tinue to be active on the Internet and in all national- and
global-scale communication systems. The challenge for
the technical community is to build systems that enable
government agencies to collect relevant data that they are
legally authorized to collect, to be held accountable to the
citizens they serve, and to respect the privacy of innocent
users.
2 The Openness Principle in Lawful
Surveillance
In this section, we review the openness principle put forth
by Bandits [15]. Readers familiar with [15] may skip to
the next section.
Necessary to any meaningful discussion of “account-
able surveillance” is an established foundation of rule of
law and democratic processes that subject the laws to
evaluation, debate, and revision. Bulk surveillance must
follow open processes, i.e., unclassified procedures laid
out in public laws that all citizens have the right to read,
to understand, and to challenge through the political pro-
cess. Processes that are not open, public, and unclassified
in this sense are referred to as secret processes. Although
government agencies need not always disclose all of the
details of a particular investigation, they do need to follow
the open processes established for all bulk surveillance.
More precisely, Bandits [15] draw a distinction be-
tween two classes of communication-system users. Tar-
geted users are those who are under suspicion and are
targets of properly authorized warrants. All others are
untargeted users; they are the vast majority of all users
of a general-purpose, mass-communication system. Ban-
dits [15] posit that the following Openness Principle
should govern all surveillance activity in a democratic so-
ciety:
I Any surveillance or law-enforcement process that
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obtains or uses private information about untargeted
users shall be an open, public, unclassified process.
II Any secret surveillance or law-enforcement pro-
cesses shall use only:
(a) public information, and
(b) private information about targeted users ob-
tained under authorized warrants via open
surveillance processes.
Bandits interpret this principle as a requirement that an
open “privacy firewall” be placed between government
agencies and citizens’ private information in a mass-
communication network. Processes that move untargeted
users’ private information through the firewall must be
open processes. The targeted class contains both known
users, i.e., those for whom the government has a name,
address, phone number, email address, or other piece of
personally identifying information, and unknown users.
It is not, as it may seem on the surface, oxymoronic to
call a user both “targeted” and “unknown,” because ambi-
ent information may justify the targeting of an individual
without identifying him or her in any standard sense of
“identify.” For example, a government agency may obtain
a “John Doe warrant” [3] to investigate users who were
present in locations Li at times Ti, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, with-
out being able to identify those users, because relevant
events occurred at those locations at those times. Ban-
dits [15] show how an accountable-surveillance protocol
can be used to obtain a large set of encrypted data about
both targeted and untargeted users, feed it into a crypto-
graphic protocol that winnows it down to the records of
users targeted by the John Doe warrant, and decrypt only
those records. Thus, targeted unknown users can be iden-
tified (i.e., turned into targeted, known users) without gov-
ernment agencies’ identifying any untargeted users whose
encrypted records are touched by the surveillance process.
The essence of the openness principle is that, by using
appropriate security technology, government agencies can
make their data-collection processes fully public without
revealing sensitive content of a specific investigation. For
a more detailed explanation, see [15, Section 2].
3 Lawful Intersection Warrants
In this section, we present an improved implementation of
the lawful set-intersection protocol of [15].
3.1 Intersections and Privacy
As described in Section 1 and in [15], the FBI used set
intersection to search for phone numbers that appeared in
three sets of cell-tower records. This procedure did not
follow the the openness principle. The FBI did not distin-
guish between targeted and untargeted users when collect-
ing the data. It only arrested the user in the intersection
of the sets it collected, as far as we know, but as there was
no established accountability procedure, we do not know
whether the FBI retained the phone numbers of untargeted
users collected during the search, whether it subjected any
of those other phone numbers to additional investigation,
whether it shared the data sets of 150,000 total users with
other government agencies, etc.
Bandits [15] presented a private set intersection proto-
col, based on the ElGamal [7] and Pohlig-Hellman [14]
cryptosystems, to address these specific concerns. We
present a summary of that protocol in Section 3.2. This
protocol reveals only the identities of users in the inter-
section of the sets under consideration, leaving the other,
untargeted users’ identities hidden by encryption. To pro-
vide accountability and oversight, the protocol requires
multiple government agencies to participate. This pro-
vides a division of authority. No one agency can un-
cover users’ identities without other agencies being able
to collect records about how often intersection warrants
are used and set restrictions on how many users the agen-
cies can identify under a single warrant.
The lawful contact chaining protocol we present in Sec-
tion 4 will produce large, encrypted sets of user identities.
These sets can then be used as inputs into the lawful set
intersection protocol, to reveal the small, targeted group
of identities that appear in multiple sets (whether those
sets come from cell tower dumps as in the High Coun-
try Bandits case, contact chaining, or some other legally
obtained source of information).
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3.2 Lawful Intersection Protocol
The participants in this protocol are government agen-
cies. Before executing the protocol, the agencies must
agree on which sets of encrypted user data they wish to
intersect. These sets are then retrieved from a repository,
which stores only ciphertexts encrypted with the ElGamal
public keys of all agencies.
Each agency’s input is its ElGamal private key and a
set of this encrypted data. For each execution of the proto-
col, the agencies also generate temporary Pohlig-Hellman
keys, which they securely delete after the protocol is com-
plete. The protocol works by converting ciphertexts in
the probabilistic ElGamal cryptosystem to ciphertexts in
the deterministic Pohlig-Hellman cryptosystem without
revealing information about the encrypted data in the pro-
cess. Because Pohlig-Hellman is deterministic, two iden-
tical user identifiers will have identical Pohlig-Hellman
encryptions.
These two cryptosystems, ElGamal and Pohlig-
Hellman, allow this conversion to take place because they
are mutually commutative with each other. That is, a ci-
phertext encrypted under some combination of multiple
ElGamal encryption keys, multiple Pohlig-Hellman en-
cryption keys, or a mixture of the two types of keys can
be decrypted only by the corresponding set of decryption
keys in any order. ElGamal and Pohlig-Hellman are ran-
domized and deterministic, respectively, and they satisfy
the mutual commutativity requirement.
During the protocol, each agency in turn runs the El-
Gamal decryption algorithm on the ciphertexts using its
private key, then runs the Pohlig-Hellman encryption al-
gorithm using its temporary Pohlig-Hellman key. Be-
cause the ciphertexts are also encrypted under the keys
of the other agencies, the agency does not learn anything
about the underlying user data during this process. The
agency then passes the altered ciphertexts on to the next
agency, which does the same with its keys. At the conclu-
sion of this process, the agencies have converted the ci-
phertexts from randomized ElGamal encryption to deter-
minstic Pohlig-Hellman encryption, without ever reveal-
ing the plaintext data.
The agencies can then directly compare Pohlig-
Hellman ciphertexts to each other to determine which ap-
pear in the intersection of all sets of data. If the intersec-
tion is much larger than expected, any one of the agencies
can delete its Pohlig-Hellman decryption key to prevent
any user data from being revealed until a more narrowly
scoped warrant can be agreed upon. Otherwise, the agen-
cies finish the protocol by using their Pohlig-Hellman de-
cryption keys to reveal only the ciphertexts in the inter-
section of all sets.
3.3 Improved Implementation of Lawful
Intersection
In [15], the authors presented a Java implementation of
the lawful set-intersection protocol. It ran on three Planet-
Lab computers representing the participating government
agencies. Although the servers split the data sets between
them, the implementation handled each set in a sequen-
tial manner, decrypting and encrypting ciphertexts one by
one.
In an experiment with 150,000 users - the same number
of users as the FBI examined in the High Country Ban-
dits case - that implementation took approximately two
hours to run to completeion. As the authors argued an
FBI investigation is likely to take days to lead to an arrest,
even without the use of this privacy-preserving technol-
ogy. Therefore, a two-hour running time may not be a
major obstacle in this context.
But because we offer a new use of the lawful inter-
section protocol, we also offer a speedier implementa-
tion of it. Our improved implementation takes advantage
of parallel processing and more advanced computational
hardware, thus showing that lawful set-intersection can be
performed much more quickly than originally described
in [15].
In our upgraded implementation, the agencies decrypt
and encrypt multiple ciphertexts in parallel, rather than
operating on them one by one. We use eight compute
threads for each server. Instead of PlanetLab computers,
which vary in speed and reliability, we use three sepa-
rate hosts on a private cloud-computer system running on
Open Stack with a Ceph storage backend.
Compared with the orginal, sequential version of the
protocol, our version requires only about 10% as much
time to run to completion. In the largest test case, which
contains a total of 150,000 ciphertexts (50,000 per server),
our implementation takes 10.5 minutes, compared with
116.2 minutes for the orginal one. A full comparison of
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Figure 1: Comparison of Lawful Intersection
Performance
our results with the those of [15] is presented in Figure 1.
4 Lawful Contact Chaining
Contact chaining [6] is a form of government surveillance
with which it is deceptively easy to expose many innocent,
untargeted users to government scrutiny. The goal of con-
tact chaining is to use information about social connec-
tions between identities, such as records of phone calls be-
tween one number and another, to identify members of a
criminal organization or terrorist group. Starting with one
or more suspects whose identities are known, the govern-
ment aims to consider contacts of those suspects. These
can be direct contacts, such as two people who spoke on
the phone, or extended contacts, such as two people con-
nected by a chain of two or more phone calls. If Alice
calls Bob, and Bob calls Charlie, then Alice and Bob are
direct contacts (as are Bob and Charlie), but Alice and
Charlie are extended contacts. We may also say that Alice
and Charlie are at distance 2 in the communication graph
(because the smallest number of phone calls that connect
Alice to Charlie is 2).
Without mechanisms to preserve privacy, a contact
chaining search can collect a surprisingly large group of
users’ information. For example, if the average cell phone
user contacts 30 individuals within the period of the inves-
tigation, a contact chaining search out to distance 3 would
capture 27,000 users on average - or many more if a heavy
phone user is swept up by the search. With such a large
group, it is assured that the vast majority of contacts will
not be the targeted collaborators of the primary suspect in
the investigation. This is a large and unnecessary intru-
sion of privacy. These untargeted users may nevertheless
face unwarranted government scrutiny, intrusive investi-
gation, or a risk that their sensitive communications his-
tories may be leaked accidentally.
Despite this risk, we recognize the potential law-
enforcement value of information about social connec-
tions between targeted invidivuals. Therefore, we pro-
pose a lawful contact chaining protocol. This protocol
permits multiple government agencies working together
to provide oversight and accountability, as advocated in
[15]. Our protocol focuses on the case in which the gov-
ernment seeks information from multiple telecommuni-
cations providers about the communication graph formed
by phone calls and text messages. Using this protocol,
the agencies can retrieve an encrypted set of user data
from multiple telecoms, each of which holds only part of
a larger communication graph. This encrypted set con-
tains the identities of users within a certain distance of a
target, but the identities cannot be decrypted unless the
agencies cooperate. Under the lawful processes we pro-
pose, this cooperation would take the form of an inter-
secton with other encrypted sets of data, using the proto-
col from Section 3. These sets can come from privacy-
preserving contact chaining, from cell tower dumps, or
from other sources of information about suspects. Impor-
tantly, while any set may contain encrypted data about
many untargeted users, very few users will appear in all
the sets, and those few users will be suitable targets for
further lawful investigation.
The same principles of oversight and accountability
provided by multiple government agencies can apply to
contact chaining searches in other types of communica-
tion graphs, such as the social network graph of Twitter
or Facebook. These cases do not require our protocol,
however, since if one provider knows the entire commu-
nication graph, it can compute the output of the protocol
without any interactivity needed.
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4.1 Protocols For Privacy-Preserving Con-
tact Chaining
4.1.1 Inputs and Parties to the Protocol
There are two types of parties in this protocol: Telecom-
munications companies (telecoms) and government agen-
cies interested in performing lawful contact-chaining
(agencies). The protocol computes a function of all par-
ties’ data.
The telecoms jointly hold an undirected communica-
tion graph G = (V,E). Each telecom knows only a sub-
set of the edges E. V contains vertices labeled with the
phone numbers they represent, and E contains an edge
between a and b if and only if phone number a has con-
tacted phone number b or vice versa within some window
of time. Each phone number v is served by exactly one
telecom. We assume telecoms know which telecom serves
which phone number. Each telecom keeps records of all
phone calls made by phones they serve, including calls
made to phone numbers served by other telecoms. The
subgraph known by telecom T is GT = (V,ET ) where
ET is the set of edges (a, b) such that a or b is a phone
number served by T . Henceforth, for any phone number
a, let T (a) be the telecom that serves a.
The agencies must each hold a copy of a warrant in or-
der to perform this protocol. A warrant is a triplet (x, k,
d). x is a target phone number. We assume, since x be-
longs to a user targeted by the agencies, that they also
know which telecom serves x. k is a (small) distance
from x, the distance at which the agencies wish to con-
sider chained contacts. For example, if k = 2, then the
agencies only wish to consider users at most 2 phone calls
away from their person (or phone number) of interest x.
Choosing a small limit is important to limiting the scope
of the investigation. However, many users’ information
might still be captured if some phone numbers have very
many contacts. Suppose the target x calls the most pop-
ular pizza place in town. Now everyone else who has re-
cently called that pizza place is at a distance 2 to x.
We can assume that business phone numbers have
many more contacts than personal phone numbers do. In
most cases, knowing that two individuals have contacted
the same business phone number does not indicate that
those individuals have a personal relationship. Therefore,
the warrant also includes d, an upper bound on the de-
gree of users the agencies are willing to “chain” through.
If a phone number has more than d contacts, then the
agencies do not consider paths to other users through that
phone number in their search. The agencies disregard d
for the initial target x, however. The high-degree users
themselves will also be present in the agencies’ outputs.
This provides a reasonable limit to the scope of the in-
vestigation and hides what are very likely to be untargeted
users from the government. In the uncommon scenario
where a business number with many contacts also func-
tions as a front or hub for a criminal organization to be
revealed, the government is still able to conduct further
investigation on it, perhaps even beginning a new contact-
chaining search with that number as the initial target.
We specify the protocol in full in Sections 4.1.4 and
4.1.5.
4.1.2 Security Assumptions
We make a few assumptions about existing cryptographic
infrastructure. All telecoms and agencies must have a
public encryption key known to all other parties to the
protocol and a private decryption key. For the purpose of
interoperability with lawful intersection, agencies’ keys
must be for a commutative cryptosystem (i.e. ElGamal).
The parties must also each have private signing keys and
public verification keys.
In the protocol below, we refer to “the agencies” send-
ing messages to one or more telecoms. Exactly which
agency transmits messages to the telecoms is not impor-
tant to our protocol, but a telecom will disregard any mes-
sage not accompanied by signatures from every agency.
One simple topology is for a single agency to handle all
direct communication with telecoms and with other agen-
cies, forwarding reponses from the telecoms on to the
other agencies and signatures on agency messages to the
telecoms.
Our protocol preserves the privacy of untargeted users
as long as all parties execute the protocol in an honest-
but-curious manner, all of the government agencies do not
collude together, and no telecoms collude with govern-
ment agencies. A colluding group containing all agencies
would be equivalent to the current situation n which the
government does not provide meaningful accountability
of its own surveillance activities; what we propose is a re-
placement for this situation, but it does require the govern-
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ment to follow its own laws, once set. A telecom collud-
ing with a government agency would amount to sending
that agency free information about its users, or submitting
incorrect information to the protocol. But telecoms have
no business purpose to deviate from the protocol and risk
legal action. In practice, existing legal tools allow law en-
forcement agencies to gather information about the phone
history of a suspect with a valid warrant, but such infor-
mation cannot generally be used for further contact chain-
ing.
In Section 6, we discuss potental ways in which our
honest-but-curious assumption might be relaxed.
4.1.3 Desired Outputs and Privacy Properties
The goal of the protocol is for the agencies to obtain a
set of ciphertexts, each of which is the encryption of a
phone number v such that the distance in the communi-
cation graph from v to the targeted phone number x is at
most k. The set should not contain encryptions of num-
bers v such that each path from x to v of length at most k
contains an intermediate vertex of degree greater than d.
Here the “intermediate” vertices in a path are all vertices
except the endpoints x and v.
Every phone number in this set must be encrypted with
each of the agencies’ public ElGamal keys. The agencies
should all have the same output.
The telecoms should not learn the agency’s output. In-
stead, each telecom’s output should contain only a list of
which of the phone numbers it serves were sent to the gov-
ernment agencies. This allows the telecoms to play an ad-
ditional accountability role in this protocol. The govern-
ment may have an interest in keeping the telecoms from
knowing which of their clients were surveilled; we dis-
cuss this in section 4.2.3.
With the encryptions of these phone numbers, the agen-
cies can then act as appropriate to further investigate them.
In particular, the encrypted set of phone numbers can be
used as an input into a lawful set intersection protocol.
Below, we present two versions of our protocol. In
the first version, the agencies and telecoms learn some
additional information. Specifically, the agencies learn
the provider of each phone number in the encrypted set,
and the distance from x of each encrypted phone number.
Each telecom learns which of the phone numbers it serves
appear in the agencies’ output, as well as the distance of
each of those phone numbers from the target phone num-
ber x.
In section 4.1.5, we will present a second version of
the protocol in which the agency does not learn which
telecom serves which encrypted phone number.
As long as our security assumptions for this proto-
col hold, the agencies collectively learn no information
about the edge set E except what is implied by the out-
put. Furthermore, the agencies cannot learn any of the
phone numbers that appear in encrypted form in the out-
put (unless implied by the size of the encrypted output and
the leaked service information), nor can agencies cause a
phone number not within distance k of target x to appear
in the output, even in encrypted form.
4.1.4 Ownership-Revealing Lawful Contact-
Chaining Protocol
The protocol below amounts to a distributed breadth-first
search of the communication graph run by the agencies
making queries of the telecoms. However, all messages
the agencies receive from the telecoms will be encrypted.
They will know which message come from which tele-
coms, and will therefore know which telecoms serve
which ciphertexts.
Let EncT (m) be the encryption of message m under
telecom T ’s public key. Call such an encryption a telecom
ciphertext. Let EncA(m) be the encryption of m under
the public keys of all agencies, and call such an encryption
an agency ciphertext.
To manage the breadth-first search, the agencies (or at
least the investigating agency) will maintain a queue Q,
containing vertices yet to explore. Q contains tuples for
unexplored vertices a of the form (EncT (a)(a), T (a), j).
These tuples contain the telecom ciphertext for a, a record
of which telecom owns a, and an integer j indicating the
remaining distance out to which neighbors can be chained
from a.
The agencies will represent their output in the form of
a list C, containing agency ciphertexts. Each telecom T
will represent its output in the form of a list LT , listing
plaintext users served by that telecom whose information
the agencies requested.
The protocol is as follows:
1. The agencies start by agreeing upon a warrant
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(x, k, d), where x is the target phone number, k is
a maximum distance, and d is an upper limit on the
degree of vertices to chain through. They encrypt x
under the public key of T (x).
2. The agencies initialize a queue Q. Initially, Q con-
tains only the triple (EncT (x)(x), T (x), k).
3. The agencies initialize the output listC to be empty.
4. Each telecom T initializes its output list LT to be
empty.
5. WhileQ is not empty, do the following:
(a) The agencies dequeue (EncT (a)(a), T (a), j)
from Q. They send the pair (EncT (a)(a), j) to
T (a).
(b) a’s provider, T (a), decrypts a from its telecom
ciphertext. It adds a to LT .
(c) T (a) encrypts a under the agencies’ public
keys, and sends EncA(a) to the agencies.
(d) If j = 0, T (a) is done. Go to step 5g.
(e) Otherwise, T (a) encrypts each neighbor b of a
under the public key of T (b), creating a tele-
com ciphertext for b.
(f) T (a) sends the number of ciphertexts gener-
ated this way, deg(a), as well as all telecom
ciphertexts generated in the previous step, to
the agencies. T (a) sends the ciphertexts in the
form of pairs (EncT (b)(b), T (b)).
(g) The agencies add EncA(a) to C.
(h) If deg(a) > d and j 6= k (i.e. a 6= x), the agen-
cies discard all telecom ciphertexts received for
a’s neighbors (i.e., agencies refuse to sign these
ciphertexts in future steps of the protocol, and
do not send them on to the telecoms).
(i) Otherwise, for each telecom ciphertext re-
ceived, the agencies add (EncT (b)(b), T (b), j−
1) toQ.
6. The agencies’ final output is the listC. Each telecom
T ’s final output is LT .
For the sake of efficiency, it is worth noting that the
inner loop can be executed many times in parallel, up to
the point of completely emptying Q at the beginning of
the loop. Many messages to the same telecom can also be
batched and sent together, thereby reducing the number of
signing and verifying operations so that they depend only
on k and not on the size of the input or output.
4.1.5 Ownership-Hiding Lawful Contact-Chaining
Protocol
The previous version of the protocol allows agencies to
learn which telecoms own the phone numbers in its en-
crypted output. This subsection presents a modification
of the previous version of the protocol, which uses a DC-
nets-based anonymity protocol to hide this information
from the agencies (except with respect to the initial tar-
get x).
An anonymity protocol is run by a number of parties,
some of which have messages to send. At the end of the
protocol, all parties must learn all messages sent, but no
party other than the sender of any given message can learn
which party sent that message. Dissent [4] and Verdict [5]
both satisfy our requirements; they are more powerful
than we need, however, because we assume all telecoms
are honest-but-curious.
We can use an anonymity protocol to allow the correct
telecom to respond anonymously in steps 5c and 5f in the
protocol above. This removes the need for the agencies to
know which telecom owns which ciphertext.
Now we can present the following modified proto-
col. This protocol uses the same data structures as
in section 4.1.4, except that Q now contains pairs
(EncT (a)(a), j) for unexplored vertices a (omitting the
identity of T (a).
1. The agencies start by agreeing upon a warrant
(x, k, d), where x is the target phone number, k is
a maximum distance, and d is an upper limit on the
degree of vertices to chain through. They encrypt x
under the public key of T (x).
2. The agencies initialize a queue Q. Initially, Q con-
tains only the pair (EncT (x)(x), k).
3. The agencies initialize the output listC to be empty.
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4. Each telecom T initializes its output lists LT to be
empty.
5. WhileQ is not empty, do the following:
(a) The agencies dequeue a pair (EncT (a)(a), j)
from Q. They send the pair (EncT (a)(a), j)
to all telecoms.
(b) All telecoms attempt to decrypt EncT (a)(a)
with their decryption keys. Only T (a) will be
able to do so. Other telecoms skip to step 5f.
(c) T (a) adds a to LT .
(d) T (a) encrypts a under the agencies’ pub-
lic keys, producing the agency ciphertext
EncA(a).
(e) If j > 0, T (a) encrypts each neighbor b of a
under the public key of T (b), creating a tele-
com ciphertext for b.
(f) All parties to this protocol engage in the
anonymity protocol. T (a) sends an anony-
mous message consisting of the agency cipher-
text it generated in step 5d; the set of telecom
ciphertexts generated in step 5e, and deg(a),
the number of telecom ciphertexts being sent.
The agencies and all telecoms that could not
decrypt EncT (a)(A) participate but send no
anonymous message.
(g) When the anonymity protocol is complete, the
agencies receive all the ciphertexts. They add
EncA(a) to C.
(h) If deg(a) > d and j 6= k (i.e. a 6= x), the agen-
cies discard all telecom ciphertexts received for
a’s neighbors (i.e., agencies refuse to sign these
ciphertexts in future steps of the protocol, and
do not send them on to the telecoms).
(i) Otherwise, for each telecom ciphertext re-
ceived, the agencies add (EncT (b)(b), j − 1) to
Q.
6. The agencies’ final output is the listC. Each telecom
T ’s final output is LT .
The protocol replaces each query in the protocol of sec-
tion 4.1.4 with broadcast of the telecom ciphertext to all
telecoms, and replaces each response with a round of the
anonymity protocol. This allows the telecom that owns
each phone number to respond with appropriate informa-
tion about the phone number, but shields the telecom’s
identity from the agencies (and incidentally from other
telecoms).
As in the previous section, It should be noted that the
agencies and telecoms need not handle one ciphertext at
a time. The agencies can in principle dequeue all of Q in
step 5a and broadcast all pending vertices to the telecoms.
In step 5f, multiple telecoms can submit multiple mes-
sages to a single run of the anonymity protocol, with only
those telecoms which were unable to decrypt any vertices
submitting no message. The exact number of messages
per instance of the anonymity protocol can be tuned for
best efficiency.
4.2 Discussion of Lawful Contact-Chaining
We now take a moment to discuss the correctness and
privacy properties of both variants of our lawful contact-
chaining protocol.
4.2.1 Correctness of Output
The agencies’ outputs from the protocols in Sections 4.1.4
and 4.1.5 will be C. C will contain agency ciphertexts
of all phone numbers at most k phone calls away from
x, considering only vertices of degree at most d. This
is the desired output. C reveals nothing to any agencies
unless they all provide their decryption keys. To continue
the process of lawful investigation, the agencies should
combine the outputCwith other sets of potential suspects
(such as from further runs of this protocol, or from cell
tower dumps) in a lawful intersection protocol.
4.2.2 Privacy
Both versions of the protocol hide the identities of the
chained contacts of x. They do allow the agencies to learn
the distance from x of each ciphertext in their output, but
these ciphertexts cannot be resolved to phone numbers
without the cooperation of all agencies.
The protocol of section 4.1.4 allows the agencies to
learn which telecoms owns which ciphertexts in C. This
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may be a security concern, since some telecoms are rela-
tively small, specialized, or localized to a particular coun-
try or region. If the agencies know that such a such a
telecom owns an encrypted phone number, this will not
allow them to identify the phone number itself, but might
convince the agencies to subject that ciphertext to addi-
tional scrutiny, up to the point of decrypting it outside the
context of lawful surveillance. This would still require
the collusion of all agencies, however. Our revised proto-
col mitigates this concern. Assuming that the anonymity
protocol used in section 4.1.5 does not allow its partici-
pants to learn who sends each message, then the revised
protocol does not leak ciphertext ownership information.
The telecoms learn two types of information as part of
the lawful contact chaining protocol. First, they learn the
warrant. Second, they learn which of the phone num-
bers they serve have been captured (in encrypted form)
by the protocol, and when they were captured. The tele-
coms might possibly be able to infer some extra informa-
tion about G from observing when vertices they own are
queried by the agencies, but only of a very limited form.
For instance, an agency may serve two phone numbers, a
and b, which the agencies query at distance 1 and 4 from
x, respectively . In that case, the telecom can infer that
there exists a path in G of length 3 between a and b. The
telecom does not learn which other phones are involved
in that path, and is already aware of all paths of length 2
or less between phone numbers it serves. Therefore, this
potential information leak is of little concern.
4.2.3 Hiding Information From Telecoms
In both versions of our protocol, the telecoms learn which
of their numbers have been submitted to the agencies.
They do not know which phone numbers the agencies will
actually investigate after running the privacy-preserving
set intersection protocol, but they do know which ones
could be under investigation. Since many numbers could
be investigated, this does not compromise the agencies’
investigative power.
We may point out nevertheless that a modification
of our protocol from 4.1.4 could allow the agencies to
hide from the telecoms which of their clients is being
surveilled. The telecoms would need to precompute
agency ciphertexts for all of their client numbers, and tele-
com ciphertexts for all of their clients’ contacts. With
these precomputed databases, the telecoms could then use
oblivious transfer to blindly serve the agencies’ requests
for information about their clients.
4.3 Performance of Privacy-Preserving
Contact Chaining Protocol
We implemented the privacy-preserving contact chaining
search protocol of 4.1.4 in Java and tested the implemen-
tation’s running time, CPU time used, and data sent over
the network. Below, we describe our implementation and
its experimental setup, and then summarize our results.
4.3.1 Java Implementation
Our Java implementation uses the variant of our proto-
col in which the agencies completely exhaust the search
queueQ each round, sending all queries at any given dis-
tance from x to the telecoms at once in batches. Ths vari-
ant allows for greater parallelism. All of the telecoms re-
ceive their batch of queries at the same time, and operate
on those queries using eight parallel threads of computa-
tion.
We use 2048-bit DSA signatures, 2048-bit RSA en-
cryption for the telecoms, and ElGamal encryption for the
agencies’ output to provide compatability with the lawful
intersection protocol of [15].
Our Java program supports any number of agencies and
telecoms, but we chose to run tests with three government
agencies and four telecoms. Each agency and telecom has
a dedicated server in our cloud testbed. As mentioned
in [15], three is a reasonable choice for the number of
agencies, corresponding to three branches of government.
Four telecoms should cover most users in any given mo-
bile phone market, and increasing the number of telecoms
in our experiments only serves to decrease the protocol’s
total running time by splitting the same users over more
servers.
4.3.2 Experimental Setup
For our underlying contact graph, we used an anonymized
data set provided by [11] containing 1.6 million users
from Pokec, a Slovakian social network. To replicate the
multi-provider environment of the real telephone network,
we assigned each user to one of four telecom servers. The
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telecoms were each given a different number of the users,
in proportion to the subscriber base of the largest four tele-
coms in the world [12].
To experiment with differently sized output sets, we ran
our protocol many times, varying x, k, and d. We chose
a variety of different-degree starting targets x, varied the
maximum path length k between 2 and 3, and varied d
from 25 to 500. For each run, we measured the total run-
ning time of the protocol, the CPU time spent by the agen-
cies and telecoms, and the amount of data sent over the
network in total.
These results are important in evaluating how practi-
cal our lawful contact-chaining protocol would be it were
put into practice by government agencies and telecoms.
However, our data set is relatively small compared to
the databases held by real telecommunications compa-
nies, and each company handles that data using differ-
ent technologies. The absolute running time and CPU
usage of executing this protocol could vary from tele-
com to telecom. Therefore, we also produced a imple-
mentation of the contact-chaining protocol which omits
all cryptographic operations. This version of the proto-
col does not preserve the privacy of users. By compar-
ing the performance of our lawful contact-chaining pro-
tocol with the zero-cryptography contact-chaining proto-
col, however, we can get a sense of the “cost” of privacy
and accountability as compared to the practice of releas-
ing plaintext data to government surveillance.
4.3.3 Results
Our implementation of lawful contact-chaining per-
formed well. Our experiments showed a linear relation-
ship between the number of ciphertexts in the output and
the running time, CPU time, and data usage of the proto-
col. We display graphs of our recorded data in Figure 2.
Taking the average of all cases with d > 25, the telecoms
used 58.2 ms of CPU time per ciphertext. The agencies
used, again in the average case, 2.0 ms of CPU time per
ciphertext. Note that these times are the sums taken over
all telecoms and all agencies respectively. Because the
agencies have do very little cryptography in this protocol,
we focus on the telecoms’ CPU time in our evaluation.
We found that our protocol was able to process, in the
average case, 197.4 ciphertexts per second. To return to
our example from earlier of a network with an average
of 30 contacts per user, a lawful contact-chaining search
with k = 2 would have 900 users in the output, and a
search with k = 3 would have 27,000 users in the out-
put. To compare these times to some of our acutal exper-
iments, we found that a search that returned 937 cipher-
texts took 6.86 seconds to run, and a search that returned
27,338 ciphertexts took 109.55 seconds to run. To pro-
vide another point of comparison, Bandits [15] refers to
the “High Country Bandits” case, in which the FBI per-
formed an intersection of 150,000 phone number to help
solve a series of bank robberies. In one of our experiments
with lawful contact chaining, we find that a similarly sized
data set of 149,535 ciphertexts took 625.08 seconds - 10.4
minutes - to compile with our protocol. Given the context
of a criminal investigation, we feel these running times
are quite reasonable.
The zero-cryptography version of our program ran, pre-
dictably, more quickly than the lawful privacy-preserving
version. The total CPU time across all telecoms needed
for our zero-crypto implementation never rose above ten
seconds, even in the largest cases. This result allows us
to disambiguate the cost of information retrieval from
privacy protection. The linear relationship between the
size of the encrypted user data set and the performance
in terms of running time, CPU time, and network data
usage of the protocol all remain even when we subrtract
out the time to run all non-cryptgraphic parts of the pro-
tocol. We therefore conclude that, even given the poten-
tal database operations real telecoms would have to con-
tend with, the cost of adding privacy-preservation to the
contact-chaining protocol will remain reasonable.
5 Related Work
Privacy-preserving computation has been studied exten-
sively. An overview of the approaches taken by the
cryptographic-research community is provided by Perry
et al. [13]; an overview of of the data-mining approach is
provided by Aggarwal and Yu [1].
Kamara [8] and Kroll et al. [10] used cryptographic
protocols to achieve privacy and accountability in the
surveillance of known targets. Bandits [15] formulated
the openness principle that we have followed and were the
first to design privacy-preserving protocols for the surveil-
lance of unknown targets.
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Figure 2: Performance of Lawful Contact-Chaining
Kearns et al. [9] present efficient graph-search algo-
rithms that distinguish targeted users from untargeted
users; for each untargeted user u, the set of direct
contacts of u remains private. Unlike our privacy-
preserving contact-chaining algorithms, which rely on
cryptographic techniques, their graph-search algorithms
rely on differential-privacy techniques.
6 Open Problems and Future Work
Bandits noted in [15, Section 6.1] that set intersection is
but one type of computation that can be of use to law-
enforcement and intelligence agencies. They observed
that it would be interesting to identify other such com-
putational problems and to devise accountable, privacy-
preserving protocols to solve them. The work in this paper
on contact chaining represents progress in that direction.
Another problem of potential interest is the retrieval
of targeted users’ postings on Facebook and other so-
cial networks, including those that are shared only with a
small subset of the targeted user’s “friends.” Accountable
surveillance of social-network postings may present novel
protocol-design challenges, because it deals with one-to-
many communication, whereas previous work in the area
dealt with pairwise communication.
For contact chaining, it may be possible to speed up our
protocols by using elliptic-curve cryptography instead of
RSA. Additionally, our assumption that all parties behave
in an honest-but-curious manner might be weakened. By
using standard zero-knowledge proof techniques, it might
be possible to create versions of the protocols in Sec-
tion 4 that are secure against, for example, a rogue agent’s
maliciously modifying telecom-supplied data in order to
falsely incriminate a victim. It may also be interesting
to generalize the differential-privacy approach of Kearns
et al. [9] so that it applies to indirect contacts as well as
direct contacts.
Finally, the Openness Principle put forth in [15] is but
one step toward a full understanding of how democratic
processes and the rule of law can be carried into the digital
world. Further investigation, much of it interdisciplinary,
is needed.
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